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Abstract
Three problems in relation to Luciano Floridi’s work on the Philos-
ophy of Information (PI) and the relationship of PI to Library and Infor-
mation Science (LIS) are considered: the claim that LIS is a materials-based
discipline, Floridi’s claim about Information as a message transfer system,
and his downgrading of Social Epistemology to be a subset of PI. The re-
cent history of LIS and the practice of professional library work are exam-
ined for evidence of the basis for making claims about LIS. A view of infor-
mation based on individual interpretations is preferred to Floridi’s account,
which is found to be too innocent of LIS practice to be accepted without
revision, as is his view of LIS as an applied PI.
Luciano Floridi has provided us with a sweeping review of work on Informa-
tion. He has, in particular, advanced claims for a Philosophy of Information
(PI), and has identiﬁed Library and Information Science (LIS) as applied
PI. He has labeled us thus contra the claims of Shera and others that LIS is
based on a social epistemology. If we accept Floridi’s claims, we will see our-
selves as part of a larger PI movement whose problems and program have
been identiﬁed by Floridi in his forthcoming Open Problems in the Philosophy
of Information (OPPI )(Floridi, in press-b). Many of these problems and sev-
eral parts of the program will be familiar to LIS readers, especially those con-
cerned with work in information retrieval. Much of Floridi’s work is com-
mendable on several counts. In particular, he has proposed a philosophical
grounding to support much of what we in the LIS community do. His work
reveals a deep structure of support in straight philosophy and in logic for
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many of our research concerns. It would be convenient to be able to use his
work as the philosophical foundation some have sought for so long.
However, there are three main concerns that make it more difﬁcult to
take Floridi’s claims without some further work. First, is the kind of idea
he has about information, as a root concept for his philosophy of informa-
tion (which he labels PI). Second, is the view he takes, entirely consistent
with his view about information, of LIS that allows him to call it an applied
PI, which effectively settles LIS as a materials-based discipline. Third, there
is room for debate about the way Floridi downgrades Social Epistemology
to be a sibling of LIS rather than a grounding explanation for it. Floridi
allows that:
a good test for a “foundational” candidate is to check whether it is able
to learn from its applied counterpart . . . LIS does not need to acquire
some ready-made philosophical foundation, it can play a key role in
shaping one. (Floridi, 2002, p. 38).
We shall see that Floridi’s account of LIS needs some amendment, and
perhaps if an enhanced view of LIS is accepted, then we can secure a more
advanced PI as a more fruitful base for LIS. In this article I shall be taking
up some of Floridi’s claims about deﬁning information and the scope of
LIS. There is also an alternative view of how the politics of LIS operate to
produce the kind of ﬁeld and profession that it is. First, we must consider
how LIS constructs itself.
LIS and Professionalism
I claim ﬁrst that the broad ﬁeld of LIS separated itself from philoso-
phy in the mid-nineteenth century. By “broad ﬁeld” I mean both the aca-
demic discipline of LIS and the practice of librarianship—the business of
running libraries and providing information. Broad LIS has been a profes-
sion equipped with professional tools that quintessentially solve the practi-
cal task in hand rather than construct a philosophically acceptable arrange-
ment of knowledge. Since Dewey, and some others, we have the tools to
arrange books on shelves and describe what they are and where they orig-
inated, and we have concentrated on being good at that. A concern for the
true relationship of any item to knowledge, or of the exact information
content of any item, has remained the domain of specialists. The claims of
LIS to be normative are muted and speciﬁc to the professional apparatus
of LIS—the classiﬁcation and description of materials, the identiﬁcation
of information-seeking behaviors, and the control (that is, universal aware-
ness of the existence) of information materials. LIS is not normative about
knowledge or its epistemology—we shall return to this later—but it oper-
ates within a cultural frame that gives purpose to its professional devices.
LIS, I maintain, has a dual focus: ﬁrst toward the rest of the academy, pro-
ducing the work on information retrieval and information-seeking behav-
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ior, the history of books, and the dissemination of ideas; and second toward
the practice of running libraries and other information agencies, where LIS
works to produce the working tools and devices of the practice. The prac-
tice of librarianship is closely related to but not co-extensive with LIS.
Second, in the twentieth century, LIS has reconstructed itself away from
an overwhelming concern with information materials (documents) and
their organizational systems to an equal concern with the behavior of indi-
vidual people who use libraries, and documents. This concern with indi-
vidual information use reﬂects an ambiguity about library service, which is
a public community facility provided for individual use. Everyone entering
a library has his or her own program in mind: there is no common social
goal, but the cumulative practice of these individuals is a social act. Librar-
ianship is a social practice, and any social epistemology must account for
this individual behavior within the social practice, and any philosophy of
LIS must account for it too. The close relationship between the way peo-
ple construct their own individual identity and individual information seek-
ing must be reﬂected in the concept of information that LIS embraces.
The practical orientation of LIS leads to a third claim. No common or
shared view exists in the LIS community about the philosophical or theo-
retical underpinnings of LIS. Indeed, many practitioners work in the be-
lief that theories can tell them little in the performance of their daily tasks.
Theoretical and philosophical explanations of what LIS might be are com-
peting for attention and primacy in rendering an account to the members
of the LIS community of what it is that we do. Within the professional so-
cial struggle for deﬁnition of the subject, those researchers, theorists, and
practitioners who want to ﬁnd and assert the intellectual underpinnings for
LIS, and who want to seek, promote, and work within an understanding of
our relation to other parts of the academy, work at times as a minority within
the ﬁeld. This is not necessarily bad and is certainly not unique. Within the
ﬁeld of law, for example, there is a similar imbalanced (in terms of num-
bers) relationship between the relatively small coterie of legal theorists and
philosophers, including U.S. Supreme Court justices and their like, and the
vast body of practicing attorneys. These latter work in a daily environment
where clients come to them seeking not learned disquisitions on whether
this or that law is good or bad, or what the intentions of a system of justice
might be, but seeking to get the law to work on their side in some dispute.
These practitioners know which forms to complete, which is the best judge
to come before, how to turn a piece of evidence to an advantage; the nice-
ties of jurisprudence they leave to others.
When I go into the library and seek the help of a librarian, I do so
because I just want that person to ﬁx the system for me by getting the book
I want, ﬁnding the references I need, ﬁxing an extension of my loans, and
getting some more copies on the shelves for my students. Many librarians
not only seem happy to work that way but are content without knowledge
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of the imperfections in our understanding of the nature of information.
When they make a point about what librarianship is, they point to custom-
er satisfaction, management of resources, and personal fulﬁllment. If they
are to give credence to a view of LIS as a social epistemology or an applied
PI, they want to be given good reasons. The tension in the LIS workforce is
not just between this theory and that philosophy, but between all the sets
of competing claims, theoretical and nontheoretical. The appeal of some-
thing like Floridi’s PI must be not just that it is right, or at least gives a more
complete explanation of our situation in the ﬁrmament of academic disci-
plines in a way that all fair-minded people must assent to, but that it is a
useful weapon in the social and political struggles within LIS for one par-
ticular set of interests. Practitioners within LIS learn about the practice
through experience of it and build their understanding by reﬂection that
leads them to adjust their practice and understanding. This subjectivity
extends beyond performance in the workplace to include reﬂection on both
personal identity and the appeal to the host-funding community of the
conception of LIS that practitioners present (Cornelius, 1996a). Any PI
must: (1) offer an explanation for a very wide range of phenomena and
practices, from book history and curatorship, reading stories to children,
and model-building in information retrieval (IR) and information seeking
and (2)take account of how we remodel ourselves (say, from being librari-
ans to being information scientists and then to being information manag-
ers) from time to time, according to the presentation of ourselves and of
our practice that we wish to make to the world.
Accounting for LIS
Floridi’s account of LIS needs to recognize the plurality of LIS, and
also the changes in the things we do and the changing status, through time,
of different parts of the LIS universe. Floridi makes LIS a normative study,
but I think this is too sweeping. Although LIS is normative in respect to
its sense of purpose, much of LIS and library practice is based on observa-
tion of use. Within strictly professional concerns, the only area where nor-
mative stances in relation to knowledge are obvious is in collection-build-
ing, and normative practices even here are largely limited to the public
library: in academic and special libraries, collection-building follows use
and clients’ demands. I think Floridi’s account is confused by the ambi-
guity that he explicitly identiﬁes in Shera’s approach to social epistemol-
ogy (Floridi, 2002, p. 40). This leads Floridi, in my view, to conﬂate two
things: the practical work of managing the work of the library by the librar-
ian and the construction of LIS. The ﬁrst, the daily focus of the librarian,
will at its best be informed but not totally prescribed by, on the one hand,
professional education, and, on the other hand, by some overall sense of
involvement in a world of liberal learning—the sense of purpose that
comes with acceptance of the benign role of knowledge in the world. The
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second, the construction of LIS, will have as one of its objectives the con-
struction of a realistic representation or schema of knowledge. In part, this
will be informed by a sense of what the organization of classes of knowl-
edge should be, but to be successful any such organization of knowledge
by LIS must mirror what the customers accept.
Consider, for example, the construction of a subject bibliography, which
could well serve as an introduction for some readers to a subject new to them.
Let us say that a subject bibliography of sociology is being compiled. What-
ever subject organization is adopted is effectively a claim by the author and
compiler to assert the character, scope, subdivisions, signiﬁcance, and se-
quence of sociology and of topics within it. Several introductory textbooks
adopt their own organization of topics and so mirror the organizational as-
sertions of the bibliographer about sociology. But, if the readers fail to ac-
cept the compiler’s version of the subject’s organization, then the bibliog-
raphy will fail. LIS cannot be normative except by accepting and adopting
the normative frame of the people using the subject. The practicing librar-
ian has but two degrees of freedom over classiﬁcation of subjects: ﬁrst, in
the decision as to which classiﬁcation scheme to use and second, a purely
local option, either to accept, because it privileges what is local and thus of
most interest and signiﬁcance, or to deny, because international consisten-
cy should be maintained, some local warrant about the sequence of subdi-
visions of a subject—and then only if the classiﬁcation scheme allows it.
The practicing librarian may be inﬂuenced by the sense of liberal learn-
ing, keeping the light of knowledge burning like a beacon for all to see more
clearly, and may be inﬂuenced by the rubrics of a professional education,
but in the sense of discovering by a cycle of reﬂection, clearer understand-
ing, and improved practice what it is that LIS might be, any librarian will
ﬁnd that their own sense of identity and their sense of the practice they are
engaged in determine what LIS is for them more so than any sense of a
social epistemology.
No practice is merely the sum of its activities. Cooking is not just the
organization of what is in the kitchen; law is not just the organization or
even the intellectual antecedents of laws; medicine is more than what is in
the textbooks. No librarian will presume to give legal or medical advice on
the basis of knowing what the books say. Although the daily practice and
focus of the librarian may be heavily centered around housekeeping tasks,
the sense of what they make available to readers is not limited to manag-
ing access to the books. For this reason, the view of LIS as either the body
of knowledge that allows the librarian to do her job or the view of LIS as a
science of information is critically short of content, particularly in Floridi’s
formation of LIS and librarianship. Floridi wants to cement LIS onto a basis
of dealing with physical materials—“its object is not knowledge itself but
the information sources that make it possible” (2002, p. 41). Because any-
thing can be a source of knowledge, and therefore of interest to LIS, he
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claims that LIS extends beyond the domain of organized knowledge, sug-
gesting that the organization of knowledge is partly outside the scope of
the librarian and that the librarian’s interest in knowledge is limited to
sources. Floridi wants this to mean that LIS needs something more basic
than a social epistemology, something that can deal with the question of
information.
It is true that LIS could make use of a PI, but for such a philosophy to
be in some kind of hierarchical relation to LIS requires more than Floridi
has so far offered us. Floridi actually has different ambitions for his PI than
merely accounting for LIS. It would be possible to argue, though, that he
needs his PI to be able to explain LIS, for otherwise a science that claims
to deal with information is being left outside and unaccounted for by PI.
Floridi summarizes the objectives of PI as follows:
PI is the philosophical ﬁeld concerned with (a) the critical investiga-
tion of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, in-
cluding its dynamics, utilization, and sciences and (b) the elaboration
and application of information-theoretic and computational method-
ologies to philosophical problems. (Floridi, 2002, p. 43)
Part (b) of this deﬁnition states clearly Floridi’s ambition for a philosophy
based on information: our concern is with part (a), but in passing we should
note that in claiming for PI a methodology for all philosophy he is also
implicitly stating a preference for PI as something that explains philosoph-
ical issues, rather than a means of explaining an information profession or
discipline.
With respect to PI (a) we have to confront some variation in Floridi’s
prescription. In several places he emphasizes the possibility of multiple the-
ories or concepts of information, setting for PI only the task of investigat-
ing the question “What is x?” (i.e., information). He quotes Shannon ap-
provingly (p. 43), “It is hardly to be expected that a single concept of
information would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible appli-
cations of this general ﬁeld” (1993, p. 180). Earlier Floridi states of PI that
“On the whole, its task is not to develop a uniﬁed theory of information,
but rather an integrated family of theories that analyze, evaluate, and ex-
plain the various principles and concepts of information . . .” and “recent
surveys have shown no consensus on a single uniﬁed deﬁnition of informa-
tion” (2002, p. 43). Contrary to this, we have substantial work by Floridi
(Floridi, in press-a) that concentrates strongly on information as well-for-
mulated, meaningful data in a data set, which seems to limit the range of
possible concepts of information to one or more of those concerned with
information as a transferred message. Furthermore, he explicitly conﬁnes
the form of information that concerns LIS to information in documents.
(LIS) Library and Information Science as Applied Philosophy of Infor-
mation is the discipline concerned with documents, their life cycles and
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the procedures, techniques, and devices by which these are implement-
ed, managed, and regulated. LIS applies the fundamental principles
and general techniques of PI to solve deﬁnite, practical problems and
deal with speciﬁc, concrete phenomena. In turn, it conducts empiri-
cal research for practical service-oriented purposes (e.g., conservation,
valorization, education, research, communication, and cooperation),
thus contributing to the development of basic research in PI. (Floridi,
2002, p. 46)
Let us pass over the evasion and unexplained entailment of “thus” in the
last line above. A science that concerned itself only with documents could
not, for example, attempt a classiﬁcation of knowledge, or even an under-
standing of how the documents are used. While the practical daily work of
many librarians is concerned with the management of documents, the rea-
son for the documents being there in the library is the expressed need of
the clientele. This expressed need, or even a need anticipated by the library
staff, is not information, it may not even translate directly into knowledge,
and it is not just documents. In our descriptive and classiﬁcatory exercises,
we deal with the concept of an idealized document of which the example
we have is but one, possibly imperfect, copy. The idea we have of a docu-
ment is not just a book in the hand, it is a concept of a complete work. That
work may be an online bus timetable, but it also may be a multivolume edi-
tion of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–1778). We may
have a one-volume abridged edition or a four-volume or an eight-volume
edition of Gibbon, but they are all linked to an abstract idea of the origi-
nal work. Gibbon’s work is a good read, but its truth-value may be disput-
ed. It certainly could not be represented as a sacred text or as a statement
of current historical scholarship. Many students would even doubt that it
is a good read. Why then can it have space, or the possibility of space, in a
modern public or academic library? It is a “Desert Island” book, along with
Shakespeare, the Bible, and Wisden (“the cricketers’ Bible”)—it is a part of
our cultural heritage. As our cultural horizons expand, we legitimize more
and more within the library—so War and Peace, the poems of Wang Wei,
Buddhist philosophy, the Gettysburg address, and others are appropriated
by us, and we in turn are expanded by contact with them. The link between
information, documents, and knowledge is the concept of learning, and it
is in a commitment to the processes of learning that LIS builds its sense of
a discipline. We can build a science of document management, what Flori-
di wants in LIS, if we have only a sense of the value of documents. To build
a knowledge and understanding of, and a philosophy for, the modern li-
brary, we need a more sophisticated sense of involvement in our culture and
the driving forces behind it. Floridi, in part, accepts this when he writes of
educational needs and values being implemented in the library (2002, p.
39). The understanding behind the library, shared by clients and librari-
ans, is that the library can meet a purpose such as education, information,
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or entertainment. Libraries, or information generally, can help attain these
ends because we all believe, usually implicitly, in some version of the En-
lightenment Project. Libraries, of course, predate the Enlightenment, but
modern librarianship, making information available to all, is a child of the
Enlightenment. We connect to our past (and thus Gibbon) both because
they enrich our sense of ourselves and because they help explain our world
to us. The belief in progress and individual betterment or empowerment
through the application of reason and the use of knowledge is the engine
of the library world, and documents are just its fuel. The conceptions we
build from time to time of what LIS is and what librarians do reﬂect our
changed understanding of the ﬁeld. (Cornelius, 1996a). The techniques
we have to manage documents are directionless without the sense of pur-
pose, cultural context, and possibilities allowed by the epistemology of the
Enlightenment. LIS cannot be reduced to the techniques of document
management and should not be confused with the job of running a library.
The library job, in fact, relates closely to the sociology of social knowledge
that Floridi rejects as a foundation for LIS. It is the social nature of library
practice that makes poignant the confusion about the deﬁnition of infor-
mation in LIS. Those seeking to build LIS based on documents would be
well-served by a concept of objective information with stable meaning; those
who look ﬁrst at the character of human information seeking are more likely
to ﬁnd information a far more complex phenomenon, with no stable mean-
ing and a base in the cultural and social contexts in which the information
is sought and used.
Floridi’s account of Information
The second problem with Floridi’s PI is its concentration, mentioned
above, on a message transfer concept of information. The possibility of
many concepts of information, seemingly allowed for by Floridi but never
openly discussed, let alone worked through, is given some attention in OPPI
(in press-b). In discussing these open problems, Floridi allows, in passing,
that it may be the case that information exists only in the mind of the in-
formee (see OPPI, Proposition 16). We can discuss this point in several ways.
It might be that we just employ the word “information” as a technical term
and limit its use to the sense in which Floridi and others commonly refer to
it, as some sense of the content of a document or proposition. To do so would
remove the possibility of discussing information as a phenomenon, or of
building a philosophy around it.
If we accept that there is a move from data to information to knowledge,
and that the latter is only in the mind of one or more receiving agents, then
we must also discuss the point at which data becomes information. Clearly
one possible explanation is that the change occurs as the information is re-
ceived by the informee. Clearly, too, the word “information” must be relat-
ed in some way to the idea of meaning, a point Floridi also raises in OPPI.
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The relationship between meaning and information is much discussed: all
that needs to be said here is that a concept of information limited to the
semantic content of a message cannot be limited to the message itself. If the
message is semantic, it must in most cases be semantic for someone. Lan-
guage is a social construction, and the meanings of messages are effectively
socially constructed too. The only exception is where information is some-
how immanent in a message and will always be there whether or not there
is an informee. The example given by Floridi is the case of tree rings. The
tree stump displays its message of how old it is by the incidence of count-
able rings in the stump, regardless of the presence or absence of a recipi-
ent. Dinosaur footprints in solidiﬁed mud also convey information despite
the dinosaur having no known intention of doing so. There is also informa-
tion of which I am unaware. As I sit in the garden with my radio turned on,
I can comprehend the information it imparts to me; when I turn the radio
off, the radio signals carrying the information are still being beamed at me
and my radio but I am unaware of them or their content. It would seem that
with the tree rings or the footprints I have the means to comprehend and
interpret the message, but with the radio waves I do not without the radio.
Thus, for an information connection to be made, it must be that I am in an
information system, which means I am dependent on technology and on a
level of education in a particular culture. To accept information, we also
must be willing to accept the authority of it. It may be that the cobblestones
in the street outside my window are varied in color and a pattern can be
distinguished in them. The pattern could appear to me to be random, but
in fact it traces the face of my neighbor’s uncle, or it could trace a date that
by coincidence is my birthday, or it could trace the words “No Parking.” It
could be that a clairvoyant revealed to me the circumstances of September
11, 2001, in New York well in advance, but that I discredited the idea as too
far-fetched. In all these cases the decision about meaning and information
is made at the point of receipt by the potential informee.
Information is what we recognize as information, but our capacity to
recognize it as such depends on several factors. Notoriously, information
received by different people is interpreted in different ways (Cornelius,
1996b). Supreme Court justices, using the same information and the same
laws, can arrive at different decisions, as the U.S. Supreme Court Justices
have done in split decisions on many occasions. Business people in similar
circumstances make different decisions—look at how airlines worldwide
responded to the problems of late 2001 onward. People in fractured com-
munities react to the same information in different ways, according to cul-
tural preferences. Furthermore, it cannot be, as Fox (1983) claimed, that
information can only be conveyed if, and only if, the informee has the ca-
pacity to know that the information is right. In the case of schoolchildren,
they cannot know whether what they learn from the teacher is right: they
must take it on trust, but they do have the capability to know because they
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function within a language game or form of life. It is the capacity to work
successfully within such a form of life that allows us to recognize libraries
and their purpose and to recognize what can count as information. These
capabilities are all learned and are dependent on memory, a sense of pur-
pose, and the ability to operate within a communication system. This is
consistent with what Evans (1982, p. 23) calls “being in an informational
state” where an information system works as a substratum of our cognitive
lives. Information becomes the function of an individual’s cognitive appa-
ratus, but it also is given effect only within a social context. Information is
a social product.
Conclusion
In summary I want to say that Floridi’s PI, as it stands, is innocent of the
social character of a ﬁeld like LIS and the way it constructs itself. His view
of information needs some easing away from a simple message transfer sys-
tem, and the unexamined concerns expressed about the position of the in-
formee in OPPI (Proposition 16) need to be accommodated within the un-
derstanding of information. Finally, his PI would be more widely applicable
in LIS if it could take into account individual information behavior.
These remarks do not dent Floridi’s PI severely, but it is legitimate to
ask that the representation of LIS as an applied PI be reworked. We need a
more empirically sensitive understanding of what LIS is and how it varies
from the practice of managing libraries. We also need an account of infor-
mation that takes into consideration the relationship between our purpose,
our practices, and the social context of information, which cannot have an
objective meaningful existence independent of a recipient. What we need,
to account for LIS practice, is “PI-2.”
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